City to pay $500K to man injured by flying log

[crazyhorse666]

D E C I S I O N On appeal from summary judgment, we review de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law. Ruiz v. 1st Fid. Loan Servicing, LLC, 829 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Minn. 2013). “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted.” STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002). A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence that could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997). The doctrine of official immunity protects public officials against personal liability for discretionary conduct unless the public official is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong. Vassallo ex rel. Brown v. Majeski, 842 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Minn. 2014). The purpose of the doctrine is to “enable public employees to perform their duties without fear of personal liability that might inhibit the exercise of their independent judgment.” Id. The doctrine “must be narrowly construed in light of the fact that it is an exception to the general rule of governmental liability.” Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Minn. 1982) (quotations omitted). A government entity may claim vicarious official immunity for the conduct of its public officials when the official’s conduct requires judgment or discretion, even at an operational level. Vassallo, 842 N.W.2d at 462; Schroeder v. St. Louis County, 708 N.W.2d 497, 508 (Minn. 2006). Examining whether official immunity applies requires the district court to identify the conduct at issue and then to determine whether the conduct is discretionary or ministerial. Vassallo, 842 N.W.2d at 462. We apply a de novo standard of review to a district court’s determination that official immunity applies. Id. We begin by identifying the conduct at issue. Fladwood argues that the conduct at issue is the “overall act” of “cutting down a tree.” The City of St. Paul contends that the conduct at issue includes the crew’s (1) decision to construct a crash pad and (2) decisions regarding where bystanders could stand outside of the safe-work zone. The supreme court’s opinion in Williamson v. Cain, 310 Minn. 59, 245 N.W.2d 242 (1976), is instructive in identifying the conduct at issue. In Williamson, the supreme court considered how to characterize the conduct of state employees tasked with removing a house. 310 Minn. at 60-61, 245 N.W.2d at 243-44. Although the court acknowledged that removing a house involves many individual discretionary decisions, the court characterized the conduct at issue as the “simple and definite,” overall task of “remov[ing] a house.” Id. at 61, 245 N.W.2d at 244. This case is analogous to Williamson. Here, as in Williamson, the crew faced many individual discretionary decisions in determining how to remove the tree. But the crew’s overall task was “simple and definite,” to remove the tree. See id. For this reason, we conclude that the overall task of removing a tree is the appropriate characterization of the conduct at issue. We next consider whether the conduct at issue is discretionary or ministerial. Discretionary conduct involves “individual professional judgment that necessarily reflects the professional goal and factors of a situation.” Vassallo, 842 N.W.2d at 462 (quotations omitted). Ministerial conduct “is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Id. (quotations omitted).1 The City of St. Paul argues that the conduct at issue is discretionary because removing a tree involves discretionary decisions based on the forestry crew’s professional judgment. But the mere fact that conduct requires some discretionary decision-making does not render the entire act to be discretionary. See Cairl, 323 N.W.2d at 23 (“[A]lmost every act involves some measure of discretion, and yet undoubtedly not every act of government is entitled to discretionary immunity.”); Williamson, 310 Minn. at 61, 245 N.W.2d at 244 (noting “almost any act involves some measure of freedom of choice” but that did “not entitle [the officials] to immunity from suit”). Further, “[o]fficial immunity typically protects the conduct of public officials responding to uncertain circumstances that require the weighing of competing values on the grounds that these circumstances offer little time for reflection and often involve incomplete and confusing information such that the situation requires the exercise of significant, independent judgment and discretion.” Shariss v. City of Bloomington, 852 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotations omitted). Minnesota courts are more likely to find official immunity in cases involving time pressure and quick decisions and less likely to find immunity in cases where public officials have ample time for consideration. Compare Vassallo, 842 N.W.2d at 462 (noting immunity protects police officers responding to emergencies because there is “little time for reflection”), with Gleason v. Metropolitan Council Transit Operations, 582 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Minn. 1998) (“Nothing about that decision requires the kind of split-second decision-making involved in a police officer deciding, for instance, whether to begin or continue a high-speed chase.”). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Fladwood, we conclude that the conduct in this case was ministerial. A forestry supervisor compiled a list of trees for the crew to remove, which included the tree at issue. The crew met to formulate a plan before removing the tree and had plenty of time to consider whether to use a crash pad, where to place the crash pad, and where to position bystanders before letting the tree fall. The crew’s task to remove the tree was “absolute, certain, and imperative,” requiring “merely the execution of [that] specific duty.” Vassallo, 842 N.W.2d at 462 (quotations omitted). Hence, the City of St. Paul is not protected by vicarious official immunity and the district court erred by granting summary judgment on that basis. Reversed and remanded.

JOHNSON, Judge (dissenting) I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court. The district court correctly concluded that the City of St. Paul is entitled to the protections of the doctrine of vicarious official immunity. A. Approximately a quarter century ago, Justice Simonett wrote that, in determining whether the doctrine of official immunity applies, “it is essential to identify the precise governmental conduct at issue.” Olson v. Ramsey County, 509 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn. 1993) (emphasis added) (citing Nusbaum v. Blue Earth County, 422 N.W.2d 713, 722 (Minn. 1988)). In the intervening years, the supreme court consistently has reiterated that statement and applied that method of analysis when determining whether challenged governmental conduct is discretionary or ministerial in nature. See Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 490-91 (Minn. 2006); Thompson v. City of Minneapolis, 707 N.W.2d 669, 673-74 (Minn. 2006); Sletten v. Ramsey County, 675 N.W.2d 291, 306-07 (Minn. 2004); Gleason v. Metropolitan Council Transit Operations, 582 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Minn. 1998); Watson by Hanson v. Metropolitan Transit Comm’n, 553 N.W.2d 406, 415 (Minn. 1996); Steinke v. City of Andover, 525 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 1994). In this case, the district court properly applied the supreme court’s well-established caselaw by identifying two precise types of governmental conduct: (1) “Teske’s decision as to whether or not to use a crash pad and how it should be constructed,” and (2) “Teske’s determination as to where bystanders should be allowed to stand outside of the safe work zone.” In light of the detailed evidence in the summary-judgment record, the proper analysis leads to the conclusion that the precise governmental conduct at issue in this case is discretionary in nature. With respect to the first type of challenged conduct, the City’s policies and practices neither require nor forbid the use of a crash pad but, rather, allow crew leaders to decide, based on the particular circumstances, whether a crash pad is appropriate to protect the surface of a street and to maintain control of a felled tree and, if so, how to construct a crash pad. Teske, the crew leader, decided to use a crash pad on January 4, 2013, after considering the location and angle of the tree, the location of surrounding structures, the weather, the available equipment, and the goal of ensuring the safety of the crew and bystanders. With respect to the second type of challenged conduct, the City’s long-standing policy is to follow a national industry standard (specifically, ANSI Z133), which calls for a circular safe zone whose radius is two times the length of the tree trunk being felled. Teske complied with this standard by ensuring that Fladwood and all other persons were more than 54 feet from the base of the 27-foot tree trunk. Fladwood cannot defeat the city’s assertion of vicarious official immunity because he cannot identify a duty that Teske failed to perform that was “absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” See Vassallo by Brown v. Majeski, 842 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

 

[crazyhorse666]

JOHNSON, Judge (dissenting) I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court. The district court correctly concluded that the City of St. Paul is entitled to the protections of the doctrine of vicarious official immunity. A. Approximately a quarter century ago, Justice Simonett wrote that, in determining whether the doctrine of official immunity applies, “it is essential to identify the precise governmental conduct at issue.” Olson v. Ramsey County, 509 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn. 1993) (emphasis added) (citing Nusbaum v. Blue Earth County, 422 N.W.2d 713, 722 (Minn. 1988)). In the intervening years, the supreme court consistently has reiterated that statement and applied that method of analysis when determining whether challenged governmental conduct is discretionary or ministerial in nature. See Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 490-91 (Minn. 2006); Thompson v. City of Minneapolis, 707 N.W.2d 669, 673-74 (Minn. 2006); Sletten v. Ramsey County, 675 N.W.2d 291, 306-07 (Minn. 2004); Gleason v. Metropolitan Council Transit Operations, 582 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Minn. 1998); Watson by Hanson v. Metropolitan Transit Comm’n, 553 N.W.2d 406, 415 (Minn. 1996); Steinke v. City of Andover, 525 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 1994). In this case, the district court properly applied the supreme court’s well-established caselaw by identifying two precise types of governmental conduct: (1) “Teske’s decision as to whether or not to use a crash pad and how it should be constructed,” and (2) “Teske’s determination as to where bystanders should be allowed to stand outside of the safe work zone.” In light of the detailed evidence in the summary-judgment record, the proper analysis leads to the conclusion that the precise governmental conduct at issue in this case is discretionary in nature. With respect to the first type of challenged conduct, the City’s policies and practices neither require nor forbid the use of a crash pad but, rather, allow crew leaders to decide, based on the particular circumstances, whether a crash pad is appropriate to protect the surface of a street and to maintain control of a felled tree and, if so, how to construct a crash pad. Teske, the crew leader, decided to use a crash pad on January 4, 2013, after considering the location and angle of the tree, the location of surrounding structures, the weather, the available equipment, and the goal of ensuring the safety of the crew and bystanders. With respect to the second type of challenged conduct, the City’s long-standing policy is to follow a national industry standard (specifically, ANSI Z133), which calls for a circular safe zone whose radius is two times the length of the tree trunk being felled. Teske complied with this standard by ensuring that Fladwood and all other persons were more than 54 feet from the base of the 27-foot tree trunk. Fladwood cannot defeat the city’s assertion of vicarious official immunity because he cannot identify a duty that Teske failed to perform that was “absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” See Vassallo by Brown v. Majeski, 842 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

Thus, the challenged governmental conduct is discretionary in nature, which means that the city is protected by the doctrine of vicarious official immunity. A contrary conclusion does not follow from Williamson v. Cain, 310 Minn. 59, 245 N.W.2d 242 (1976) (per curiam). The Williamson opinion predates the line of cases cited above and, accordingly, does not anticipate the need “to identify the precise governmental conduct at issue.” See Olson, 509 N.W.2d at 371 (emphasis added). In addition, the Williamson opinion does not discuss any factors that might have guided the governmental employees’ exercise of discretion, likely because no such evidence or argument was offered or because the governmental employees’ conduct could not have been justified by any discretionary decisionmaking. See 310 Minn. at 60-62, 245 N.W.2d at 243-44. For whatever reason, the Williamson opinion does not contain the analysis that is required by the supreme court’s more recent opinions. Furthermore, the facts of Williamson have no more than a superficial similarity to the facts of this case. The demolition of the house in Williamson did not involve the use of a crash pad and did not involve any decision about where bystanders should stand during the demolition process. See id. at 60, 245 N.W.2d at 243. In short, Williamson does not preclude or curtail the analysis that is prescribed by the supreme court’s opinions in Olson and subsequent cases. Fladwood also contends, in part, that official immunity does not apply because the challenged governmental conduct did not require split-second decisionmaking. Fladwood’s contention is contrary to the purpose of official immunity, which is “to protect public officials from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.” Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). This purpose may be served in cases that do not involve split-second decisionmaking. Indeed, both the supreme court and this court have applied the doctrine of official immunity in cases in which the challenged governmental conduct did not involve split-second decisionmaking. See, e.g., Sletten, 675 N.W.2d at 300-08 (maintenance and regulation of compost site that allegedly contaminated groundwater); Olson, 509 N.W.2d at 371-72 (formulation of case plan for child in need of protection); Semler v. Klang, 743 N.W.2d 273, 277-79 (Minn. App. 2007) (notification of presence of sex offender), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2008); Meier v. City of Columbia Heights, 686 N.W.2d 858, 863-66 (Minn. App. 2004) (abatement of “garbage house”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004); Huttner v. State, 637 N.W.2d 278, 284-86 (Minn. App. 2001) (monitoring of compliance with treatment plan to control mental illness), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001). I would not alter the analysis prescribed by Olson and subsequent opinions on the ground that Teske’s conduct did not require splitsecond decisionmaking. In sum, I would affirm the well-reasoned decision of the district court.

 

[crazyhorse666]

Thus, the challenged governmental conduct is discretionary in nature, which means that the city is protected by the doctrine of vicarious official immunity. A contrary conclusion does not follow from Williamson v. Cain, 310 Minn. 59, 245 N.W.2d 242 (1976) (per curiam). The Williamson opinion predates the line of cases cited above and, accordingly, does not anticipate the need “to identify the precise governmental conduct at issue.” See Olson, 509 N.W.2d at 371 (emphasis added). In addition, the Williamson opinion does not discuss any factors that might have guided the governmental employees’ exercise of discretion, likely because no such evidence or argument was offered or because the governmental employees’ conduct could not have been justified by any discretionary decisionmaking. See 310 Minn. at 60-62, 245 N.W.2d at 243-44. For whatever reason, the Williamson opinion does not contain the analysis that is required by the supreme court’s more recent opinions. Furthermore, the facts of Williamson have no more than a superficial similarity to the facts of this case. The demolition of the house in Williamson did not involve the use of a crash pad and did not involve any decision about where bystanders should stand during the demolition process. See id. at 60, 245 N.W.2d at 243. In short, Williamson does not preclude or curtail the analysis that is prescribed by the supreme court’s opinions in Olson and subsequent cases. Fladwood also contends, in part, that official immunity does not apply because the challenged governmental conduct did not require split-second decisionmaking. Fladwood’s contention is contrary to the purpose of official immunity, which is “to protect public officials from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.” Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). This purpose may be served in cases that do not involve split-second decisionmaking. Indeed, both the supreme court and this court have applied the doctrine of official immunity in cases in which the challenged governmental conduct did not involve split-second decisionmaking. See, e.g., Sletten, 675 N.W.2d at 300-08 (maintenance and regulation of compost site that allegedly contaminated groundwater); Olson, 509 N.W.2d at 371-72 (formulation of case plan for child in need of protection); Semler v. Klang, 743 N.W.2d 273, 277-79 (Minn. App. 2007) (notification of presence of sex offender), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2008); Meier v. City of Columbia Heights, 686 N.W.2d 858, 863-66 (Minn. App. 2004) (abatement of “garbage house”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004); Huttner v. State, 637 N.W.2d 278, 284-86 (Minn. App. 2001) (monitoring of compliance with treatment plan to control mental illness), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001). I would not alter the analysis prescribed by Olson and subsequent opinions on the ground that Teske’s conduct did not require splitsecond decisionmaking. In sum, I would affirm the well-reasoned decision of the district court.

In examining the distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts in the application of official immunity, the district court relied heavily on what it calls “the snowplow and road grader cases.” See Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d 497; In re Alexandria Accident of Feb. 8, 1994, 561 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. June 26, 1997). Those cases involved discretionary immunity at both the policy making level by the road authority and the operational level by employees. See Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 505-08; Alexandria Accident, 561 N.W.2d at 545, 547. At the operational level, the landscape was very dynamic for the employees, involving quickly changing road, weather, or traffic conditions. See Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 506; Alexandria Accident, 561 N.W.2d at 549. The present case involves a more static situation, with fixed and designated facts. The tree, like the house in Williamson, was just standing there. See 310 Minn. at 60, 245 N.W.2d at 243. There was sufficient time to develop a plan and take the necessary steps to make sure that there was no damage to other property in the area or injury to any person in the vicinity. Thus, we conclude that Williamson is the more analogous case for purposes of our official immunity analysis.

TO: The Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota: Respondents Delmer V. Fladwood and Roxanne Fladwood respectfully request this Court deny the Petitioner’s request for review of the decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals. At the outset, Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred by identifying the wrong conduct to be analyzed. Petitioner never explains, however, how the criteria enumerated under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 117 for discretionary review are implicated by the alleged error. This case merely involves cutting down a tree. Whether the Court’s focus is on the act of cutting down the tree or on the particulars of how Crew Chief Teske chose to take the tree down matters not. The Court of Appeals’ decision, whether wrong or right, does not implicate the Rule 117 criteria. The question presented by this case is not “an important one upon which the Supreme Court should rule.” It is ludicrous for the City to contend that the decision has “statewide-impact on hundreds of thousands of public employees throughout Minnesota.” The Court of Appeals’ decision affects only a small class of people at best. Likewise, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals has “so far departed from accepted and usual course of justice as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court’s supervisory powers.” The Court of Appeals decision merely follows the precedents established by this court in Williamson v. Cain, 310 Minn. 59, 245 N.W.2d 242 (1976) (court characterized conduct at issue as the “simple and definite” overall task of “remov[ing] a house”); and Terwilliger v. Hennepin County, 561 N.W.2d 909 (Minn.1997) (decisions made by psychiatrist “no matter how difficult and no matter how much professional judgment is required,” does not implicate the type of discretion protected by official immunity). Moreover, this is not a case where a decision by this Court will help “develop, clarify, or harmonize the law” and is one that calls for the application of a new principle or policy or has possible statewide impact, or is likely to recur unless resolved by this court. Undoubtedly, taking down the tree required some measure of discretion. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals did not depart from the teachings of a long line of Minnesota cases holding that “almost every act involves some measure of discretion, and yet undoubtedly not every act of government is entitled to discretionary immunity.” Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Minn. 1982); and Williamson, 245 N.W.2d at 244 (noting that “almost any act involves some measure of freedom of choice” but that alone does not entitle an official to immunity from suit). Here, Crew Chief Teske undoubtedly exercised some independent decisionmaking. Such independent decision-making, however, is involved in even the most mundane of tasks conducted by government employees throughout the State of Minnesota each and every day. The Minnesota courts have spoken clearly that simply exercising discretion does not even begin to implicate official immunity. Finally, Respondents note that the Court of Appeals followed the line of Minnesota cases holding that the concept of official immunity should be construed narrowly because it is an exception to the general rule of governmental liability. Cairl, 323 N.W.2d at 23.
CONCLUSION The Court of Appeals decision in this matter is sound. It follows well-established precedent. The case does not break new ground, does not constitute an issue of possible statewide impact, and the issue is not likely to recur. Accordingly, the Petition must be denied. Date: June 28, 2016 Respectfully Submitted,

I apologise for introducing the idea of full and proper research to a forum which doesn't appear to have come across it before.

 

[crazyhorse666]

Of course it is serious.
No jokes involved, but I'll explain it to you:

There are many layers of governance in the USA, and any might become involved with that story. Since it was a city government, they are somewhat protected from liability lawsuits, but not completely. OSHA is the primary investigative work-related safety agency, but they typically do not become involved with accidents that do not involve employees. Had OSHA been involved, the liability suit would probably have waited for a determination so as to increase the value of their lawsuit.

No settlement would have stopped nor interfered with any "investigation" regarding safety rules enforcement. What happened was that the injured parties sued the city to recover their damages in a process that is referred to as civil liability lawsuit. Collectively, the lawyers involved with both sides of the litigation decided a monetary value to settle upon prior to going to court, and that was end of it. Victims got paid, guilty party paid for their damages. Lawyers took a nice cut from everyone involved.

I'm sorry but that is simply not true. The case did make it to court. A decision was handed down in favour of the City. This was appealed. The appeals court reversed the original ruling, finding in favour of the appellant.. The City appealed to the Supreme Court which refused to hear their appeal.

 

[crazyhorse666]

Occupational Safety & Health Administration. That pretty much covers it.

We likely don't know where that video came from (I don't at any rate). If it was privately owned, it will remain that way.

As to reports, those will be public only as much as they can be tied to a public agency. If it was any part of a government report, the information can be had with a great deal of patience & money through the use of our Freedom of Information act. Any prrivately owned reports will almost certainly be locked down tight by the legaleze of the settlement agreement.

How about simply looking up the court records of the case?

 

[crazyhorse666]

Yes, and I can prove that it usually works out that way, too. For the most part, on-the-job accidents are handled by the responsible insurance companies or civil litigation, unless it gets the attention of a criminal investigation.
Why is "learning anything" an intrinsic and necessary requirement for you concerning accidents?

I had a tree climber die while working for me. DEAD on the job, while working under my employment. He was "life flighted" to a hospital after 3 resuscitation efforts by the paramedics and subsequently reported DOA. I never even got so much as a knock on my office door from any agency. Not even from my Worker's Comp insurance company.

I'd just as soon not go into the details of all that event here. Search Arborist site for posts by me mentioning Kenny, and you might find it.

It would appear that you can just read the original article to learn about the investigation and the measures that were introduced following it.

ST. PAUL PUTS IN NEW SAFETY MEASURES​

St. Paul immediately made changes. Fladwood was injured on a Friday and all forestry workers met the Monday morning that followed “to review and strengthen the standard of securing the work zone for both traffic and pedestrian safety,” according to a 2013 email from St. Paul’s forestry supervisor.

The department stopped using tree debris “as a cushion for protection of paved surfaces” when cutting down large trees, according to the email, though St. Paul Parks and Recreation spokeswoman Clare Cloyd said that’s “still an accepted practice in the industry.”

St. Paul now uses large steel plates to cushion a large tree’s fall, Cloyd said.

After the incident, forestry crews began using a form to document traffic and pedestrian safety in work zones. On high-traffic sites, they now assign at least one worker whose sole job is making sure pedestrians and traffic don’t get too close, Cloyd said.

The city also purchased two-way radios and headphones for crews, for better communication.

The city reviewed what happened in 2013 and determined “no discipline was appropriate or necessary” for employees, Cloyd said.

The article also discusses the court cases, but I consider the actual transcripts to be more reliable.

 

[Philbert]

I'm sorry but that is simply not true. The case did make it to court. A decision was handed down in favour of the City. This was appealed. The appeals court reversed the original ruling, finding in favour of the appellant.. The City appealed to the Supreme Court which refused to hear their appeal.

I like this version, which I can read.

Thank you for you efforts on this thread.

Philbert

 

[Cricket]

Is this actually serious? Surely it is some kind of joke that the City, or anyone else for that matter, can pay a settlement which halts any further investigation of the incident. How can anything be learnt from that approach? Any serious accident like that would be fully investigated by WorkSafe, a government body with wide reaching investigative powers, over here. They don't care about any financial settlements, their role is to investigate any serious workplace incident to determine the likely causes and what measures need to be introduced to prevent it happening again. If they find serious negligence by any party, they can recommend criminal charges. You can't buy your way out of a criminal negligence trial.

I often suspect that "learning from that approach" is exactly what they're trying to avoid.

 

[rabbit box]

We have an immunity litigation protection in Beaufort county N.C. Pat fell at the county landfill. The cement pad was uneven and in poor condition. She broke the tibia bone, fibula bone, and several bones in her foot. She had surgery and now has six pins in her foot. No lawyer will take the case. N.C. is one of four states that the county, city , or state cannot be sued. This is what she shared with me. The lawyer in Beaufort county is Herman Gaskins. The second lawyer she contacted was in Pitt county NC.